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a b s t r a c t 
We study the human capital effects of private equity buyouts in Germany. We conduct 
matched-sample difference-in-differences estimations at the establishment and at the in- 
dividual employee level with more than 152 thousand buyout employees and a carefully 
matched control group. Buyouts are followed by a reduction in overall employment and an 
increase in employee turnover. Employees of buyout targets experience earnings declines 
equivalent to 2.8% of median earnings in the fifth year after the buyout. Managers and 
older employees fare far worse after buyouts compared with the average target employee, 
even though they are not more likely to lose their jobs at the target compared with other 
employees. We argue that the employees most negatively affected after buyouts are those 
who are less likely to find new employment, not those who are most likely to lose their 
jobs. Evidence exists of a reduction in administrative staff and more hiring for jobs that 
require IT skills. 
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In this paper, we analyze the human capital risk associ- 
ated with private equity (PE) buyouts in Germany. 1 The so- 
cial costs associated with private equity restructuring have 
been the subject of emotional debates. The head of the 
German Social Democratic Party once compared buyout 
firms with “swarms of locusts” who “descend on compa- 
nies, graze, and then move on,” suggesting that private eq- 
uity firms make short-term profits by imposing large costs 1 The literature conventionally refers to leveraged buyouts (LBOs), 
whereas our study is on private equity buyouts (PE buyouts). We discuss 
this distinction in Section 2.1 . 
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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 on employees. 2 Discussions in other countries created sim-
ilar sentiments. 3 
The literature in finance and economics has conven-
tionally regarded private equity buyouts as vehicles for
improving firms’ governance and operating performance,
facilitating growth and creative destruction, and, more re-
cently, modernizing firms’ technology. 4 From this modern-
ization perspective, private equity buyouts create value by
fashioning leaner firms and enhancing growth through or-
ganizational, operational, and technological improvements.
Critics argue that shareholders gain in private equity
buyouts at the expense of other stakeholders, in par-
ticular, the government through lower taxes, and em-
ployees. This transfer-of-wealth view echoes the criti-
cal stance articulated in the public debate. Shleifer and
Summers (1988) provide a theoretical foundation for this
view and suggest that investor-led restructurings do not
create value but simply transfer wealth from employees
and other stakeholders to shareholders by reneging on
implicit contracts. 
We contribute to this debate by analyzing 511 pri-
vate equity buyouts in Germany between 2002 and 2008.
Germany is fairly representative for the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regard-
ing employment protection legislation (EPL), making it a
well-suited laboratory for studying this matter. 5 We per-
form matched-sample difference-in-differences analyses at
the establishment level and the individual level. We first
match each target establishment to multiple control estab-
lishments and then we match each target employee to an-
other employee from one of the matching control estab-
lishments. Matching at both levels is performed based on
a rich set of establishment, job, and employee character-
istics. We conduct analyses at the establishment level and
the individual level over a five-year period after the buy-
out. 
We ask two questions: How do job growth, separa-
tions, and hiring at the establishment level develop after
buyouts? Are buyouts associated with human capital risk
for the employees of target firms? We ask both questions2 See Bild am Sonntag, April 17, 2005 (see also http://de.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Heuschreckendebatte ). 
3 Davis et al. (2014) cite a closely related argument by then prime min- 
ister of Denmark Poul Rasmussen (see Wong, 2007 ). The same arguments 
about private equity firms were rehearsed again in the 2012 US presi- 
dential campaign when Democratic politicians chastised Republican can- 
didate Mitt Romney for his career at Bain Capital, blaming him for socially 
irresponsible restructuring methods. See Weisberg (2012) . The Interna- 
tional Trade Union Confederation made similar statements ( ITUC, 2007 ). 
4 The following papers articulate these views, for operating perfor- 
mance: Jensen (1989) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) ; for facilitat- 
ing growth: Boucly et al. (2011) ; for catalyzing creative destruction: 
Davis et al. (2014) ; and for modernizing technology: Agrawal and Tambe 
(2016) and Olsson and Tåg (2017) . 
5 Our assessment is based on the EPL index published by Allard 
(2005) and constructed by the OECD, which was also used by Simintzi 
et al. (2014) . In 2003, the last year reported by Allard (2005) and the sec- 
ond year of our sample, Germany ranks 12th in terms of the strictness of 
employment protection among 21 OECD countries with an index value of 
2.1, which is also the mean. Other countries with studies on the employ- 
ment implications of buyouts include the US (index value: 0.6; rank 21), 
the UK (index value: 1.4; rank: 15), and Sweden (index value: 2.7; rank: 
5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 for all employees in our sample and for groups of em-
ployees who could be particularly vulnerable to or who
could benefit from restructuring. The two questions we ask
are related but distinct. PE firms may increase employee
turnover without reducing overall establishment-level em-
ployment, and some of the employees who are replaced
and lose their jobs with the target perhaps do not find
new employment. We find this to be the case for older
workers, who lose their jobs at target establishments at al-
most exactly the same rate as younger workers but expe-
rience significantly larger losses of long-term employment
and wages. Hence, it is important to distinguish firm-level
decisions and individual outcomes, because some groups,
e.g., low-paid workers, seem to find new employment eas-
ily, whereas others, such as older workers, often remain
unemployed. 
Buyout establishments reduce their employment by
8.96% more compared with the control group in the period
up to five years after the buyout. This effect can be decom-
posed into an increase in the separation rate of 18.75% and
an increase in the hiring rate of 9.79%. About half of the in-
crease in departures from buyout targets results in replace-
ments and the other half in job destruction. The inves-
tigation of deal-level growth, separation, and hiring rates
shows a strong and positive correlation between hiring
rates and separation rates and almost half of the buyouts
are followed by a period of increased employee turnover.
Moreover, we often find higher separation rates and higher
hiring rates for the same groups of employees. Private eq-
uity firms restructure firms by reducing employment and
by replacing employees. In our sample, they employ both
strategies at about the same rate. The increase in hiring
is largely concentrated in the first years after the buyout,
whereas most of the separations happen in later years. We
may observe separations later because buyout firms want
to increase profitability toward the end of their invest-
ment horizon to achieve better sales prices. Alternatively,
the evaluation of targets’ operations and the implementa-
tion of restructuring strategies could simply take time. We
find, at the individual level, a downward trend in employee
earnings after private equity buyouts. The average buyout
target employee loses € 980 in annual earnings after five
years compared with the matched control group, which is
2.8% of median earnings in our sample. 
The individual-level analyses identify three groups
of employees whose post-buyout losses are significantly
larger than those of the average buyout employee: white-
collar workers, managers, and older employees. Our discus-
sion of employee groups is guided by three sets of explana-
tions of buyout-related changes in employment and wages:
(1) organizational streamlining, (2) technological modern-
ization, and (3) transfers of wealth. We begin with or-
ganizational streamlining, i.e., the notion that buyout in-
vestors reduce administrative staff and layers of manage-
ment. White-collar workers experience higher separation
rates with less replacement in the short term and signif-
icantly higher losses of employment and earnings com-
pared with other employees, consistent with the notion
that buyout investors streamline firms by reducing admin-
istrative staff. For managers, we find very strong results
at the individual level, but not at the establishment level,
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duce layers of middle management. We thus attribute the 
adverse development for managers to their difficulties in 
finding new employment, not the human resource policies 
of buyout investors. 
Next, we turn to the argument that buyouts foster 
technological modernization. Private equity firms can im- 
plement new technologies, either because target managers 
resist change or because private equity investors have 
additional technological expertise. As a result, buyout 
targets can undergo faster technological modernization 
than control firms. We are careful to distinguish different 
notions of technological change, each of which has spe- 
cific and sometimes different im plications for employees. 
Proponents of the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) 
hypothesis ( Katz and Autor, 1999; Autor et al., 2003 ) argue 
that technological change is biased against lower-skilled 
jobs and increases wage inequality. Separation rates for 
low-wage workers are almost twice as high as those 
for the sample as a whole. They are not displaced by 
those with higher wage levels, but by other low-wage 
employees. The net rate of job growth for low-wage work- 
ers is not unusually low, whereas turnover is unusually 
high. Individual-level results even show that low-wage 
employees lose less after buyouts than other employees, 
suggesting that skill-biased technological change does not 
determine individual outcomes. 
According to a more recent version of the technological- 
modernization argument, medium-skilled workers could 
lose out toward either high-skilled or low-skilled work- 
ers through the displacement of routine jobs as a result 
of investments in information technology and robots (rou- 
tinization) or through the reorganization of supply chains 
and trade (offshoring). We investigate these hypotheses at 
the individual and at the establishment level by looking at 
a range of technology-related job and employee classifica- 
tions and find no evidence to support these hypotheses in 
our sample. Closely related is the argument that techno- 
logical trends favor groups who have skills complementary 
to new technologies, such as information technology (IT) 
skills. We find some evidence that employment in jobs that 
require stronger IT skills increases in the first two years af- 
ter buyouts. 6 
Finally, we investigate if buyouts involve a transfer of 
wealth in which the new owners gain at the expense 
of buyout target employees. We distinguish two versions 
of the transfer-of-wealth argument, both of which rely on 
implicit-contract theory. The first version holds that op- 
timal risk-sharing between employees and firms involves 
that firms offer em ployees em ployment insurance (e.g., 
Azariadis, 1975 ) and that dynamic wage profiles rise over 
time, providing quasi-rents for older workers ( Harris and 
Holmstrom, 1982 ), which buyout investors can appropriate. 
The second version holds that new owners benefit at the 
expense of employees by taking advantage of employees’ 
lock-in from firm-specific human capital. The separation 
rates between older and younger employees do not differ, 6 See Autor et al. (2003) and Autor and Dorn (2013) . On buyouts, see 
Agrawal and Tambe (2016) and Olsson and Tåg (2017) . and the separation rates for employees with higher tenure, 
our measure of firm-specific human capital, are lower than 
those for employees with lower tenure. Hence, we find no 
support for either version of the transfer-of-wealth argu- 
ment from these as well as other analyses. The finding on 
tenure is better explained by insider-outsider theories that 
postulate the entrenchment of insiders and more job se- 
curity for employees with a longer tenure on their jobs 
( Lindbeck and Snower, 1986; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988 ). 
Nonetheless, we show a large long-term decline in earn- 
ings for older employees, the only group for which we ob- 
serve a significantly negative effect on daily wages. These 
observations suggest that older employees suffer from the 
increase in employee turnover because they are less suc- 
cessful in finding new employment and sometimes have to 
accept employment for lower pay. 
Several theories we investigate, in particular, explana- 
tions related to organizational streamlining and techno- 
logical change, build on the notion that buyout investors 
change the composition of the workforce of buyout targets. 
Apart from the observations on white-collar workers and 
jobs with IT requirements, no support exists for explana- 
tions related to the composition of the workforce. Instead, 
we find declining employment and increased employee 
turnover for most groups of employees, which is broadly 
consistent with the modernization perspective on private 
equity buyouts. Increased turnover has long-term negative 
consequences for those employees who have more diffi- 
culty finding new employment, probably because the new 
owners after the buyout identify lower-ability employees 
and their departures from the buyout target provide a neg- 
ative signal to the labor market. 
Prior work on the human capital consequences of buy- 
outs studies employment and wage effects mostly at the 
firm level or at the establishment level. 7 Three recent con- 
tributions are close to ours in terms of data and methodol- 
ogy. Davis et al. (2014) are unique in combining firm-level 
and establishment-level analyses. All other papers focus on 
only one level of analysis. Our analysis complements theirs 
by combining individual- and establishment-level analy- 
ses. Two contributions to the buyout literature are based 
on individual-level data. Olsson and Tåg (2017) analyze 
individual-level employment data for private equity buy- 
outs in Sweden. They find strong evidence for labor mar- 
ket polarization, which contrasts with our results, most 
likely because the economic environment and labor market 
regulation in Sweden are different from that in Germany. 
Agrawal and Tambe (2016) use an individual-level data set 
obtained from an online job-search platform in the US. 
They argue that buyouts increase IT-related investments, 
which enhance workers’ human capital and increase firms’ 
likelihood of survival. We differ from Agrawal and Tambe 
(2016) in terms of methodology, data sources, and results. 
Our analysis includes a broader set of variables and cov- 
ers aspects of modernization other than IT-related invest- 7 A non-exhaustive list of papers on the employment consequences of 
buyouts is Kaplan (1989) , Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) , Wright et al. 
(1992) , Amess and Wright (2007) , and Boucly et al. (2011) . The surveys by 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) , Wright et al. (2009) , and Eckbo and Thor- 
burn (2013) list additional contributions. 
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 ments. By relying on an online job-search platform, their
analysis perhaps does not reflect the negative impact of
buyouts on workers who do not use such platforms. 
Our paper also contributes to the larger literature on
finance and labor, which is too large to present and discuss
here. We contribute to the part of the finance and labor
literature that investigates how corporate finance decisions
and events affect employees. Other parts of this literature
investigate the implications of mergers and acquisitions
( Tate and Yang, 2016; Lee et al., 2018 ), bankruptcies
( Brown and Matsa, 2016; Graham et al., 2013 ), and capital
structure choices ( Matsa, 2010; Agrawal and Matsa, 2013 ).
The buyout context differs from mergers and acquisitions,
as it does not involve a reallocation of employees between
acquirer and target, and from bankruptcies, as the buyouts
in our sample do not seem to be in financial difficulties.
We do not analyze leverage. The two studies on capital
structure analyze questions entirely different from ours. 
The following Section describes our data set and the
matching methodology. Section 3 presents establishment-
level and individual-level analyses for the whole sample.
Section 4 analyzes groups of employees and Section 5 con-
cludes. 
2. Data and methodology 
In this section, we describe the construction of the
sample ( Section 2.1 ), the matching process ( Section 2.2 ),
and descriptive statistics ( Section 2.3 ). 
2.1. Sample construction 
The analysis requires linking three separate data sets: a
data set containing private equity backed majority acqui-
sitions, a data set on establishments (Establishment His-
tory Panel, BHP, see Schmucker et al., 2016 ), and a data
set containing the employment history of individuals (In-
tegrated Employment Biographies, IEB). The administrative
establishment and employment history data are provided
by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in Nurem-
berg, Germany. The IAB data are not organized in terms of
legal units such as companies, but in terms of establish-
ments, defined by their physical location. 
We collect data on 891 German private equity buy-
outs for the period 20 02–20 08 by integrating into one data
set the transactions reported in Thomson One and Capi-
tal IQ and a proprietary data set of the Bundesverband für
Kapitalanlagegeselleschaften (BVK). We include all deals in
which a private equity investor acquires a majority stake
in a firm. In the following, we use the terms “private eq-
uity buyout,” “PE buyout,” or just “buyout.” The data set
starts in 2002, because coverage of PE buyouts for ear-
lier years is very low in all three databases. We exclude
secondary buyouts as well as transactions after 2008, be-
cause we want to observe the performance over the sub-
sequent five years, and individual employment history data
are available only until 2013. This leaves 798 transactions.
Table OA1 in the Online Appendix provides an overview of
the steps involved in constructing the sample. 
We collect the subsidiary structure of buyout targets
provided by Hoppenstedt’s Firmendatenbank. The IAB thenemploys record linkage techniques (for details, see the Ap-
pendix) to link parent companies and majority-owned sub-
sidiaries to their establishments in the BHP. After this step,
we are left with 544 transactions and 2,652 establish-
ments. For those 544 transactions, we select all employ-
ees for whom we have sufficient information on all control
or matching variables on both the employee and the estab-
lishment level over the 11-year period we require. Our em-
ployee data come from the IEB. For an overview on all con-
trol and matching variables, see Table 1 and Table OA2 in
the Online Appendix. The IEB contain detailed longitudinal
data on almost the entire German workforce. We provide
details on the sources of the IEB and our data preparation
in Section A.2 of the Appendix. Next, we delete all transac-
tions for which we find fewer than ten employees, because
companies with fewer than ten employees enjoy privileges
in terms of labor protection laws. Excluding these deals
is inconsequential for our results. These steps leave 513
transactions, 2,563 establishments, and 208,449 employ-
ees. In the final step, we construct matched samples on
both the establishment level and the individual level. We
eventually end up with 511 transactions, 2,420 target es-
tablishments, and 152,057 target employees. 
We collect some additional information on target firms.
This information is limited, because disclosure regulation
for private firms was not enforced before 2007 and stan-
dard financial data are not available for most of our target
firms for most of our sample period. Therefore, we match
the target firms to data that were collected by Creditre-
form, a company specialized on debt collection, and pro-
vided to us by the Centre for European Economic Research
(ZEW). We can match close to half of our sample and pro-
vide the results in Table OA3 in the Online Appendix. Cred-
itreform provides credit scores in four levels from “very
good” to “very critical,” and 216, or 93% percent of firms
for which credit scores are available, have a credit score of
“good” or “very good.” Creditreform asks companies about
their business outlook and rates business outlooks on a
scale with 12 verbal descriptions, which we aggregate into
five scores from best (“expanding”) to worst (“declining”).
Only 15 or 6.4% of the 233 companies for which data were
available in the event year described their business outlook
as “declining” or “stagnating” in the event year; 42 (18%)
did not respond to this question. Based on their credit rat-
ings and descriptions of their business outlook, most target
companies appear to be financially healthy. Only about 6%
to 7% of the firms for which we have data seem to be de-
clining or in a critical situation. 
German labor regulation provides employees with sig-
nificant representation on the supervisory boards of cor-
porations. Corporations with more than five hundred em-
ployees in Germany are required to have at least one-third
of the members of the supervisory board elected by em-
ployees. For firms with more than two thousand employ-
ees, half of the seats of the supervisory board are reserved
for employee representatives. The firms in our sample are
mostly below these thresholds. Hiring and separation rates
of establishments do not differ depending on the level of
employee representation on the board, and we do not fol-
low up on this categorization. (See Table OA4 in the Online
Appendix.) 
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Table 1 
Description of variables. 
The table describes all numerical variables. For each variable, the table reports the definition and the value range. 
Variable name Definition Range 
Age Age of the individual in years [0; ∞ ] 
Daily Wage Earnings divided by Days Employed ]0; ∞ ] 
Days Employed Sum of days in employment over all spells in one calender year [0;366] 
Earnings Sum of income across all spells in one calendar year [0; ∞ ] 
Employed One unless unemployed or in vocational training 0 or 1 
Establishment Age Years since first record of establishment in database [0; ∞ ] 
Establishment Size (E) Number of employees in establishment [0; ∞ ] 
Establishment Wage Average Daily Wage of employees in establishment [0; ∞ ] 
Firm Tenure Days in employment in current spell [0; ∞ ] 
Fraction Employed Days Employed divided by 366 [0;1] 
Employment Growth Employment growth rate of establishment j from time t to [–2;2] 
Rate (g) time t + k , see Appendix Section A.3 for a precise definition 
Hiring Rate (h) Flow of newly hired employees of establishment j from time t [0;2] 
to time t + k , see Appendix A.3 for a precise definition 
IT-Integrated Job One if the job description includes the use of at least one Information 0 or 1 
Technology (IT)-integrated tool as defined in Genz, Janser, and Lehmer (2019) 
IT-Related Job One if the job description is associated with an above median use 0 or 1 
of IT related tools as defined in Genz, Janser, and Lehmer (2019) 
Manager One if occupational group is equal to “Managers” (cf. Table 3 ) 0 or 1 
Offshorable Job One if high offshorability risk job as defined in Goos, Manning, and 0 or 1 
Salomons (2014) 
Routine Job One if high routine intensity job as defined in Goos, Manning, and 0 or 1 
Salomons (2014) 
Separation Rate (s) Flow of leaving employees of establishment j from time t to [0;2] 
time t + k , see Appendix A.3 for a precise definition 
Target One if employee is in target company 0 or 1 
Total Earnings Sum of Earnings of all employees employed in an establishment [0; ∞ ] 
Total Earnings Growth Total Earnings growth rate, computed analogously to g [–2;2] 
White Collar One if employee is associated with occupational groups (8), (9), or 0 or 1 
(10) as defined in Table 3 2.2. Constructing matched samples 
We perform a two-stage matching process in which we 
first match target establishments to control establishments 
and then draw control employees from a set of control es- 
tablishments. 
2.2.1. Matching establishments 
For each target establishments, we identify 50 poten- 
tial control establishments using the BHP and the follow- 
ing criteria. We remove all establishments from the BHP 
that have been targets themselves at any time during the 
sample period. 8 We then build matching cells based on 
two-digit industry affiliation (60 categories), establishment 
size deciles, establishment age classes (ten classes: zero 
to two, three to five, six to ten, 11–15, 16–20, 21–25, and 
more than 25 years), and the buyout year (seven calendar 
years). This step is closely modeled on the process used 
by Davis et al. (2014) and results in 29,400 cells, of which 
1,185 are filled after matching. Next, we pick the 50 nearest 
neighbors in terms of the Euclidean distance based on es- 
tablishment size, establishment age, median establishment 
daily wage, the shares of medium-qualified, highly quali- 8 We explored an alternative matching algorithm, in which we allow 
establishments to become controls as long as they have not been part 
of a buyout transaction in the five years before the matching year. The 
changes for the control sample would be negligible and affect at most 
0.4% of the control establishments. We did not pursue this line of analysis 
further because the scope for look-ahead bias seems to be negligible. fied, full-time, and female employees, and the average age 
of all employees. 
For each target establishment, we identify the ten clos- 
est establishments out of the 50 potential control es- 
tablishments based on the normalized Euclidean distance 
computed over establishment size, establishment age, 
mean establishment daily wage, the shares of medium- 
qualified, highly qualified, full-time employees, and fe- 
male employees, and the average age of all employees. We 
match with replacement; i.e., a control establishment can 
be matched to more than one target establishment. Our fi- 
nal establishment data set contains 2,420 target establish- 
ments and 24,147 control establishments. We find at least 
six matches for each target establishment. 
2.2.2. Matching employees 
In the final step, we form a control group of matching 
employees. For each employee from the buyout group, we 
select a matching employee from one of the matched con- 
trol establishments identified in the previous step. To base 
our matching on characteristics that have not been affected 
by the buyout, we match on characteristics recorded in the 
year before the buyout announcement. We match individ- 
uals exactly in terms of education, employment status, ex- 
perience, gender, industry, nationality, occupation, qualifi- 
cation, and geographic location (region) (cf. Table OA2 in 
the Online Appendix for a detailed overview). We remove 
individuals for whom the absolute deviation from the tar- 
get employee in terms of Earnings, Age , or Tenure is larger 
than 25%, the absolute deviation in Establishment Size from 
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 the target employee is larger than 50%, and the absolute
deviation of Days Employed from the target employee is
larger than 45 days. Finally, we pick the nearest neighbor
based on the normalized Euclidean distance of the numer-
ical variables. 
We match with replacement; i.e., we allow for a con-
trol employee to be matched to more than one target em-
ployee. The final individual-level data set contains 152,057
target employees. We can match 74% of all target employ-
ees based on our criteria. The number of control employ-
ees is equal to 130,553, which is smaller than the num-
ber of target employees because of matching with replace-
ment. 
2.2.3. Matching success 
We match individuals exactly on the nine categori-
cal variables listed in Section 2.2.2 . For the five numeri-
cal variables, the relative differences between the target
group and the control group are low or very low. (See
Tables OA5 and OA6 in the Online Appendix for match-
ing statistics.) We use the normalized differences proposed
by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and used by Imbens
and Rubin (2015) to examine significant differences be-
tween two groups of observations. Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009) recommend that normalized differences be below
0.25 in absolute value. We record a test statistic of 0.13
for the fraction of full-time employees (Table OA6). For all
other matching variables on both the establishment level
and the individual level, the test statistic is never higher
than 0.06, and we conclude that our control groups match
target establishments and target employees very closely on
all relevant criteria. 
The differences between matched and unmatched buy-
out employees are substantial and largely the result of
industry clustering of transactions. We have greater dif-
ficulty with matching part-time employees and those
without vocational training. Hence, our analysis does not
include these, arguably more vulnerable, groups of em-
ployees. Consequently, annual income and tenure are both
substantially lower in the unmatched employee sample
than in the matched employee sample. 
2.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the numeri-
cal variables. Our data set consists of 511 deals with 425
employees on average. Two-year pre-buyout employment
growth is 13.36% on average, which shows that our sam-
ple is not dominated by restructuring buyouts. We observe
each target establishment and each target individual over
time from five years before the buyout to five years after
the buyout. Our final data sets are panels of 185,969 es-
tablishment years and about 3.35 million individual years.
The average employee is 42 years old and has held his or
her current job for almost 9.5 years. A very small number
of individuals enter our data set when they are still be-
low working age because we track individuals starting five
years before the buyout. 
Table 3 describes the composition of the individual-
level sample with respect to qualification, gender, nation-
ality, occupation, and education, separately for controlemployees and employees of PE buyout targets. The fourth
column shows the composition of the whole labor force
based on IAB data. The composition of the labor force is
based on 2004 data, which is halfway between the first
year (2001) and the last year (2007) of the sample we
use for matching. PE buyouts target mostly manufacturing
companies, which are overrepresented in the buyout
sample (66.3% of employees) relative to the economy in
general (25.7%). This bias reflects PE investors’ tendency
to acquire firms in manufacturing and the larger size
of manufacturing targets (see Table OA3 in the Online
Appendix on the industry composition of the deals in
our sample). The higher weight of manufacturing in the
sample characterizes all differences between the compo-
sition of the buyout sample and the German labor force.
About a quarter of employees are grouped into the lowest
occupational group of simple manual occupations, and
only 17% of the general labor force belongs to this group.
Managers constitute only 3.1% of the whole sample, in
line with the general labor force. Women have a share
of 24.4% in the sample, much less than the proportion of
women in the labor force (46.1%). The PE buyout sample
is biased toward employees with an intermediate school
leaving certificate and vocational training (69%) compared
with the German labor force (59%), toward the south of
Germany (49% versus 38%), and toward full-time workers
(89% versus 59%), a consequence of comparatively poor
matching of part-time employees. 
3. Employment and wages after private equity buyouts 
This section analyzes the development of employment
and wages after PE buyouts at the establishment level
( Section 3.1 ) and at the individual level ( Section 3.2 ). 
3.1. Establishment-level analysis 
We build on Davis et al. (2014) and define the growth
rate of employment from time t to time t + k as g j,t ,t + k =
E j,t+ k −E jt 
0 . 5 
(
E j,t+ k + E jt 
) , where E jt denotes the level of employment
in establishment j at time t . Subscript t refers to points in
time for stock measures (employment) and to periods for
flow measures (e.g., separations). Precise definitions of all
variables can be found in Table 1 . We regress one-year and
multi-year growth rates of employment on a buyout-target
indicator, the two-year pre-buyout growth rate, and a set
of fixed effects: 
g j,t −1+ k,t + k = αt + 
∑ 
c 
D c j δc + λg j,t −3 ,t −1 + θk × T arget j 
+ ε j,t+ k , k = 0 , . . . , 5 , (1)
where D cj is a set of dummy variables for cell c for es-
tablishment j , in which cells are defined by the full cross
product of buyout year, industry, firm size category, and
firm age category (see Section 2 ). In Eq. (1) , Target jt is a
dummy variable equal to one for target establishments in
all sample years. We follow Davis et al. (2014) and control
for past employment growth using g j,t −3 ,t −1 , even in re-
gressions in which the dependent variable is not employ-
ment growth. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics. 
This table provides descriptive statistics for all numerical variables. The establishment-level data set consists of 
2,420 target establishments, 24,147 control establishments, and seven years of observations: (2,420 + 24,147) ×7 = 
185,969 establishment-year observations. The individual-level data set consists of 152,057 target employees, the same 
number of control employees, and 11 years of observations: 152,057 ×2 ×11 = 3,345,254 individual-year observations. 
“Pre-buyout growth rate” denotes the growth of deal-level employment from the end of t − 3 to the end of t − 1 . All 
other variables are defined in Table 1 . 
Standard 
Variable name N Mean Median Minimum Maximum deviation 
Panel A: Deal statistics 
Employees 511 425 182 10 8,902 825 
Pre-buyout growth rate 511 13.36% 4.14% −178.64% 20 0.0 0% 49.34% 
Panel B: Establishment-level data set 
Establishment Size (E) 185,969 77 19 0 8,257 205 
Growth Rate (g) 185,969 −3.62% 0.00% −20 0.0 0% 20 0.0 0% 54.83% 
Hiring Rate (h) 185,969 25.62% 15.38% 0.00% 20 0.0 0% 34.13% 
Separation Rate (s) 185,969 29.23% 16.00% 0.00% 20 0.0 0% 41.26% 
Panel C: Individual-level data set 
Age 3,345,254 42 42 10 81 11 
Daily Wage 3,071,118 102 99 0 1,663 42 
Days Employed 3,345,254 329 365 0 366 98 
Earnings 3,345,254 34,251 34,474 0 207,583 17,505 
Firm Tenure 3,345,254 3291 2374 0 14,245 3069 
Fraction Employed 3,345,254 1 1 0 1 0 
IT-Integrated Job 3,345,254 26% 0% 0% 100% 44% 
IT-Related Job 3,345,254 46% 0% 0% 100% 50% 
Offshorable Job 3,210,327 62% 100% 0% 100% 49% 
Routine Job 3,287,989 48% 0% 0% 100% 50% All establishment-level regressions are weighted, with 
weights proportional to employment to give larger es- 
tablishments a higher weight. 9 Throughout the paper, we 
report t -statistics and significance levels based on stan- 
dard errors clustered at the firm level (see Petersen, 2009; 
Abadie et al., 2017 ). We discuss some of the issues re- 
lated to firm-level clustering and deal-level clustering in 
Appendix Section A.1 , where we also discuss further ro- 
bustness checks. 
We are interested in decomposing establishment-level 
employment growth after PE buyouts into separations 
and new hires. Let H jt ( S jt ) be the number of employ- 
ees who enter (leave) establishment j in period t , and de- 
note the normalized flow of newly hired employees by 
h jt = 
H jt 
0 . 5 ( E jt + E j,t−1 ) 
, analogously for the separation rate s jt . 
With these definitions, g j,t−1 ,t = h jt − s jt . (See Appendix 
Section A.3 for further details.) We estimate Eq. (1) with 
g j,t−1 ,t , h jt , and s jt as dependent variables, but with the 
same set of controls and independent variables as in 
Eq. (1) . The coefficients of interest are the difference-in- 
differences estimates of θ k ( g ) [ θ k ( h ), θ k ( s )], which measure 
by how much the employment growth rate (hiring rate, 
separation rate) for buyout establishments exceeds that of 
matching control establishments. The coefficients have to 
add up such that θk ( g ) = θk ( h ) − θk ( s ) , i.e., the establish- 
ment growth rate equals the difference between hiring rate 
and separation rate. 9 We divide our sample into three subsamples based on deal size and 
repeat the analysis in Table OA4 in the Online Appendix, which shows 
that our results are not driven by a small number of deals with very large 
establishments. We caution the reader to be careful with causal inter- 
pretations of these coefficients. While we take great care 
with our matching algorithm (see Section 2.2.3 ), match- 
ing relies on observables. We cannot measure output, labor 
productivity, the quality of management, or other charac- 
teristics of the workforce that could be relevant for buyers 
in private equity buyouts and could give rise to selection 
effects. 
The results of this analysis are in Table 4 . Panel A 
shows the results for regressions with one-year employ- 
ment growth rates, annual separation rates, and annual 
hiring rates for the event year t and each of the sub- 
sequent five years after the buyout. We observe a long- 
term, cumulative establishment-level employment decline 
between periods t and t + 5 of 8.96%. 10 Kaplan (1989) finds 
industry-adjusted employment losses at buyout targets of 
6.2% to 12.0% for an earlier sample. For the UK, Wright 
et al. (1992) report employment losses for buyouts of 
6.3% with a subsequent recovery. Lichtenberg and Siegel 
(1990) find an 8.5% decline over three years, and Davis 
et al. (2014) find only 2.6% for a comparable period. Over- 
all, the large literature on this topic ( Wright et al. (2009) 
review 17 papers on employment effects) tends to find 
comparable long-term effects of leveraged buyouts (LBOs), 
albeit with significant variation across studies. 
From Table 4 , the net cumulative employment de- 
cline of 8.96% can be decomposed into an increase in 10 Our results correspond to what Davis et al. (2014) describe as a semi- 
parametric regression with homogeneous treatment effects across the 
cells defined in the matching process (see Section 2.2.1 ). In unreported 
results, we reproduce their nonparametric specification. The results are 
not much different from the semiparametric results, neither in their case 
nor in ours, and are, therefore, not reported. 
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Table 3 
Sample description. 
This table provides an overview of our sample with respect to our categorical variables. Occupational groups are based on the job classification 
scheme provided in Blossfeld (1987, p. 99). “Semi-professions” are service-oriented jobs with a high degree of scientific education, such as 
nurses, social workers, and secondary school teachers. “Professions” covers service-oriented jobs with a very high degree of scientific education, 
e.g., physicians, judges, and pharmacists. “Managers” contains both executives and mid-level managers. Each occupational group is assigned a 
level of qualification (low, medium, high). “Intermediate secondary school degree” indicates that the person graduated from a secondary school 
after nine or ten years of schooling. “High school degree” indicates that the person graduated after 12 or 13 years of schooling with a German 
“Abitur.” The exact number of years depends on school type and state. “Immigrant population” covers employees who are citizens of Italy or 
Turkey or who are from a former Yugoslavian country. Our sample contains 152,057 private equity (PE) buyout employees, the same number of 
control employees, and 56,392 unmatched PE buyout employees. The statistics are based on the year prior to the transaction. 
Target Control Unmatched Total 
Category employees (%) employees (%) employees (%) labor force (%) 
Occupational group (qualification) 
(1) Simple manual occupations (low) 24.8 24.8 20.8 17.1 
(2) Skilled manual occupations (medium) 20.0 20.0 15.5 14.3 
(3) Technicians and engineers (high) 16.7 16.7 7.6 6.3 
(4) Simple service (low) 8.3 8.3 14.1 19.7 
(5) Qualified service (medium) 0.7 0.7 2.2 3.3 
(6) Semi-professions (medium) 0.5 0.5 1.8 4.6 
(7) Professions (high) 0.6 0.6 2.1 1.9 
(8) Simple commercial and administrative occupations (low) 6.4 6.4 12.3 11.4 
(9) Qualified commercial and administrative occupations (medium) 19.0 19.0 20.8 19.0 
(10) Managers (high) 3.1 3.1 2.6 2.3 
Females 24.4 24.4 42.0 46.1 
Nationality 
German 93.6 93.6 86.5 89.8 
Immigrant population 4.3 4.3 6.1 5.1 
Rest of the world 2.1 2.1 7.4 5.1 
Occupational status 
Vocational training 1.5 1.5 19.8 7.8 
Full-time employees 88.7 88.7 51.4 58.7 
Home worker 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Part-time employees 9.7 9.7 28.5 33.8 
Education 
Intermediate secondary school degree 
Without vocational training (low) 10.9 10.8 32.5 23.3 
With vocational training (medium) 69.2 69.2 47.5 58.7 
High school degree 
Without vocational training (medium) 0.9 1.0 3,0 3.4 
With vocational training (high) 5.5 5.5 6.5 5.8 
College or university degree (high) 13.5 13.6 10.5 8.9 
Industries 
Manufacturing 66.3 66.3 27.4 25.7 
Retail, maintenance and repair services 13.2 13.2 14.6 17.3 
Real estate 13.6 13.6 20.4 15.1 
Telecommunications 3.9 3.9 5.6 5.5 
Construction 1.4 1.4 3.1 6.3 
All other 1.6 1.6 28.9 30.1 
Region 
North (Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bremen) 14.0 14.0 17.6 15.6 
East (Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 11.4 11.4 15.6 18.2 
Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia) 
South (Hessen, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria) 49.2 49.2 43.4 38.4 
West (North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland) 25.5 25.5 23.4 27.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 separations associated with PE buyouts of 18.75% and a
9.79% increase in the hiring rate. Similar to Davis et al.
(2014) , we observe that PE buyouts are associated with
a simultaneous increase in the layoff rate and the hir-
ing rate, a process they describe as creative destruction.
Table 4 shows the ratio of the coefficients θ ( h )/ θ ( s ). Over
the five-year period after the buyout, about half of the
buyout-related separations are replaced by new hires, and
the other half of the jobs are lost permanently. 
To further explore the pattern of separations and hir-
ing we rerun Eq. (1) for rates from the event year to yeart + 5 separately for each deal in our sample and obtain
511 estimates of θ f ( h ) and θ f ( s ). We plot θ f ( s ) against θ f ( h )
in Fig. 1 . The cross-sectional correlation between θ f ( h )
and θ f ( s ) is 48.7%. Post-buyout separation rates and hiring
rates, each calculated relative to a control group, tend to be
strongly positively correlated, and about half of the deals
are followed by increased separation and hiring rates. 
The time-series patterns of hiring, job losses, and em-
ployment decline reveal a phase-shift in this develop-
ment. In the event year and the subsequent two years,
the buyout-related cumulative separation rate is low at
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Table 4 
Establishment-level aggregate employee flows. 
The table reports estimated employment growth rates and coefficients θ between targets and 
controls in the buyout year ( t = 0 ) and subsequent years from Eq. (1) . In every regression, we 
control for each of our matching cells based on two-digit industry, buyout year, Establishment 
Age , and Establishment Size . See Section 2.2 for further details. In addition, we control for pre- 
buyout growth g j,t −3 ,t −1 . The coefficient θ denotes the coefficient θ ( g ) if the dependent vari- 
able in Eq. (1) is employment growth, θ ( s ) if the dependent variable is the separation rate, and 
θ ( h ) when the dependent variable is the hiring rate (see Appendix Section A.3 for definitions 
of growth rates, separation rates, and hiring rates). The variables are defined in Table 1 . Each 
reported coefficient is for a different semiparametric, employment-weighted regression. For ex- 
ample, in “t + 2 , ” we report θ ( g ), which is calculated for the one-year growth rate g j,t +1 ,t +2 from 
t + 1 to t + 2 following the buyout. In “t to t + 2 , ” we report the estimated differences from the 
beginning of the event-year until the end of the second year after the event-year. The num- 
ber of observations is 26,567 (2,420 target establishments and 24,147 control establishments). 
θ ( h )/ θ ( s ) denotes the ratio of the coefficients. In Panel B, we perform a sample split into public 
targets and private targets. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and we present the 
corresponding t -statistics below the coefficient estimates. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable 
Employment growth Separation Hiring Total earnings 
Rate [ θ ( g )] Rate [ θ ( s )] Rate [ θ ( h )] θ ( h ) / θ ( s ) Growth 
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Growth rates and worker flows 
t −0.0092 0.0229 ∗∗ 0.0137 60% 0.0018 
−0.65 2.25 1.48 0.12 
t + 1 −0.0053 0.0230 ∗∗ 0.0177 ∗∗ 77% −0.0027 
−0.39 2.21 1.98 −0.21 
t + 2 −0.0050 0.0189 ∗∗∗ 0.0138 ∗∗ 73% −0.0019 
−0.55 2.59 2.23 −0.21 
t + 3 −0.0353 ∗∗∗ 0.0422 ∗∗∗ 0.0069 16% −0.0295 ∗∗
−3.02 3.83 1.23 −2.46 
t + 4 −0.0187 0.0341 ∗ 0.0154 ∗∗ 45% −0.0237 
−0.94 1.85 2.17 −1.24 
t + 5 −0.0186 0.0298 ∗∗ 0.0112 38% −0.0176 
−1.21 2.31 1.34 −1.17 
t to t + 2 −0.0186 0.0594 ∗∗∗ 0.0407 ∗∗ 68% −0.0088 
−0.89 3.11 2.47 −0.41 
t to t + 5 −0.0896 ∗∗∗ 0.1875 ∗∗∗ 0.0979 ∗∗∗ 52% −0.0787 ∗∗
−2.61 4.45 2.83 −2.14 
Panel B: Sample split into public targets and private targets 
Public targets ( N = 87) 
t to t + 2 −0.0282 0.0581 ∗ 0.0299 52% −0.0154 
−0.67 1.74 0.71 −0.37 
t to t + 5 −0.1376 ∗∗ 0.1605 ∗∗∗ 0.0229 14% −0.1322 ∗∗
−2.26 2.98 0.34 −2.02 
Private targets ( N = 424) 
t to t + 2 −0.0173 0.0599 ∗∗∗ 0.0426 ∗∗∗ 71% −0.0081 
−0.73 2.69 2.61 −0.34 
t to t + 5 −0.0773 ∗ 0.1921 ∗∗∗ 0.1148 ∗∗∗ 60% −0.0648 
−1.93 3.74 3.02 −1.52 
 5.94%, so 68% of buyout-related separations are replaced, 
as measured by the ratio θ ( h )/ θ ( s ), resulting in a small 
cumulative employment decline of 1.86%. If we cumu- 
late the rates for three to five years after the transaction, 
we can observe how this pattern changes. The buyout- 
related cumulative separation rate increases to 10.61% 
( = 4.22% + 3.41% + 2.98%) and the cumulative hiring rate 
decreases to 3.35% ( = 0.69% + 1.54% + 1.12%). The replace- 
ment ratio θ ( h )/ θ ( s ) drops to about 0.3 ( = 3.35% / 10.61%),
resulting in a more pronounced employment decline of 
about 1.81%. The years in the immediate aftermath of the 
transaction could be characterized as years of creative de- 
struction, with comparable increases in the separation rate 
and the hiring rate, and later years seem to be character- 
ized more by streamlining, associated with more job losses and less replacement. We conjecture that PE investors em- 
phasize streamlining and cost-cutting in later years be- 
cause their investments have a finite time horizon. As they 
approach the time when they want to resell target compa- 
nies or take them public, cost-cutting could become more 
important. Alternatively, PE investors could take time to 
evaluate operations in a newly acquired firm and to im- 
plement reorganization measures, which could also explain 
why separations do not happen immediately after buyouts. 
Finally, Column 5 of Table 4 reports the same regression 
results with the growth of total earnings as the dependent 
variable. Total earnings of an establishment are defined as 
the sum of income earned in this establishment for all em- 
ployees who have been employed at that establishment at 
the end of the calendar year. The post-buyout development 
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Fig. 1. Deal-level hiring and separation rates. The figure plots the coefficients θ f ( s ) against θ f ( h ) from estimating Eq. (1) for rates from the event year to 
year t + 5 separately for each deal in the sample. The cross-sectional correlation between θ f ( h ) and θ f ( s ) is 48.7%. Of the 511 deals, 234 (46%) have positive 
estimates for both θ f ( h ) and θ f ( s ), and 122 (24%) have negative values for both; 74 deals (14.5%) have θ f ( h ) < 0 and θ f ( s ) > 0; and 81 deals (15.9%) have 
θ f ( h ) > 0 and θ f ( s ) < 0. 
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12 We cannot calculate hourly wages, because our data do not report the 
number of hours worked per day or per week. According to Table 3 , 6% of 
our sample are part-time employees for whom Daily Wage will be lower 
than a full-time equivalent daily wage. 
13 This transformation is commonly applied but not necessarily without for earnings growth and employment growth would dif-
fer between target and control establishments if PE firms
would systematically replace high-earning employees with
employees who earn less to cut costs, or if they would do
the opposite, e.g., to attract more qualified employees. The
development of establishment-level earnings growth mir-
rors that of employment growth, suggesting no systematic
bias toward hiring or laying off better-paid employees. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports a sample split of the estab-
lishments into public versus private targets. The split ac-
cording to public status shows that the coefficients θ ( s ) on
separation rates in the two subsamples are virtually iden-
tical, but those on hiring rates, θ ( h ), are much higher for
private targets than for public targets. Consequently, em-
ployment growth is lower for public targets than for pri-
vate targets. On average, it is negative for both groups, and
the difference is statistically not significant. 11 These results
stand in contrast to Davis et al. (2014) , who observe posi-
tive growth for private targets. Their results are at the firm
level and include the employment effects of starting new
establishments. In Table OA7 in the Online Appendix, we
perform an individual-level analysis to investigate if em-
ployees of public targets fare differently after buyouts. We
cannot find any significant differences. 
3.2. Individual-level analyses 
Our approach for the individual-level analysis builds on
Jacobson et al. (1993) and Couch and Placzek (2010) , who
use panel regressions with fixed effects and matching es-
timators in a program evaluation context. We define three
main outcome variables Y . it 
11 The aggregate effect is now positive, and these data are available for 
only about 40’% of the sample. 1) Earnings —The employee’s earnings summed up over all
employment spells in a given year. 
2) Daily Wage —Earnings of employee i in year t , divided by
the number of days employed during that year. Daily
Wage is set to missing if the employee or the em-
ployee’s match was unemployed during the whole year
t . 12 
3) Days Employed —The number of days in year t during
which employee i was employed. 
Our analysis relies on matched-sample difference-in-
differences regressions: 
 it = αi + γt + 
k =+5 ∑ 
k = −5 
δk D ik + T arget i ×
k =+5 ∑ 
k = −5 
θk D ik + ε ik . (2)
In Eq. (2) , Y it denotes the outcome variable in levels ( Earn-
ings, Daily Wage, Days Employed , or their logarithms), αi
and γ t are, respectively, individual and calendar-year fixed
effects, i indexes individuals, t indexes calendar time, and
k indexes event time. In all cases, when we refer to
the logarithm of a variable Y , we use the transformation
ln ( 1 + Y ) . 13 The event time dummy variables D ik begin five
years before the buyout ( k = −5 ) and end five years after
the buyout ( k = +5 ). Our data cover all individuals from
five years before to five years after the event, and the dum-
mies for the year before the event ( k = −1 ) are omitted.problems if Y is small relative to one. See Burbidge et al. (1988) and Pence 
(2006) for further discussion. Because the values of all our variables Y are 
orders of magnitude larger than one, the resulting approximation error is 
very small. 
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Fig. 2. Parallel trends analysis: Earnings . This figure presents the development of Earnings in event time. For every event-year, we compute the mean of 
Earnings for target employees and control employees separately. Earnings is defined in Table 1 . All event time effects thus are measured relative to the 
year before the buyout. The dummy variable Target i dis- 
tinguishes employees of PE buyout targets from employees 
in the matched sample (controls) and equals one for target 
employees in all sample years. Clustering of standard er- 
rors is again at the firm level (see Appendix Section A.1 for 
further details). 
The approach in Eq. (2) generalizes standard difference- 
in-differences estimators by adding a temporal dimension 
to the standard dummy variable POST , which would as- 
sume a value of one in the post-buyout period. Eq. (2) dif- 
fers from Jacobson et al. (1993) and Couch and Placzek 
(2010) by entering the event time dummies D ik in ad- 
dition to the calendar time effects γ t . PE buyouts hap- 
pen at different dates in calendar time, so the event-year 
dummies are not collinear with calendar-year effects (see 
Boucly et al., 2011 ). The parameters of interest are the co- 
efficients θ k on the interactions D ik × Target i , which mea- 
sure the average difference between target employees and 
control employees for the outcome variable Y it in event- 
year k . By contrast, the coefficients δk measure the aver- 
age differences in event time, after controlling for calendar 
time effects. As in the case of the establishment-level anal- 
ysis, we are careful with causal interpretations, because we 
cannot exclude selection effects; unobservable factors in- 
fluence wages, employment, and buyout decisions. 
We demonstrate that our data do not violate the paral- 
lel trends condition and show the trends before the event 
graphically for Earnings, Daily Wage, and Days Employed 
in Figs. 2 to 4 . The figures provide a first look at the 
individual-level data by showing the post-event trends as 
well. For all three variables, almost-perfect parallel devel- 
opments are evident from t − 5 to t − 1 . Daily Wage for 
both groups grows at a rate of about 2.4% per year. Days 
Employed trends upward for employees in the target and 
control groups from t − 5 to t − 1 , peaking at 357. The 
inverted-V pattern is a mechanical consequence of the re- 
quirement that employees in both groups have to be em- 
ployed in the event year, but not necessarily before or after 
the event-year. (See Fig. 3A in Davis et al. (2014) for a sim- 
ilar effect.) We begin with an analysis of the impact of PE buy- 
outs on Earnings , defined as labor income summed across 
all employment spells of an employee in a given calen- 
dar year. Fig. 5 plots the coefficients θ k on the interaction 
D ik × Target i from Eq. (2) without controls except for per- 
son and calendar-year fixed effects. We tabulate the coeffi- 
cients on D k × Target in Table OA8 in the Online Appendix. 
Panel A of Fig. 5 reports results in euros and the number 
of days, and Panel B reports results in log points. Earnings 
decline steadily by 24 log points over the six-year period 
from the beginning of the event year to the end of the fifth 
year after the event, to which we refer as the long term. 
The decline is € 979 of annual income, which corresponds 
to 2.8% of the median wage for all target employees in the 
sample. The change in Earnings is very skewed, giving rise 
to more extreme estimates in terms of log points. 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) find that average annual 
compensation per production worker increases by 3.6% in 
the second year after the buyout and that non-production 
worker compensation falls by 5.2%. Amess and Wright 
(2007) show that, in their sample of management buy- 
outs and management buy-ins, buyouts have a 0.53% lower 
growth of income per worker compared with other firms. 
Davis et al. (2014) find reductions in annual earnings per 
worker. These studies look at the development of employ- 
ees’ total annual earnings for up to two years after the 
buyout. 
We decompose the development of Earnings into a 
wage component and an employment component by 
studying the effects on Daily Wage (dashed line) and Days 
Employed (broken line). No measurable association exists 
of PE buyouts with Daily Wage , with a long-term decline 
of € 0.32 per day (0.66 log points) relative to a median 
of € 99.29. Earlier studies on the employment effects of 
LBOs either do not analyze wages or look at annual earn- 
ings per worker, which corresponds to our definition of 
Earnings (see Wright et al. (2009) for a more extensive 
survey and the Introduction for a discussion of this liter- 
ature). Employment of target employees declines by 8.83 
days per year (13.6 log points) over the long term, which 
corresponds to 2.4% of the median of Days Employed . 
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Fig. 3. Parallel trends analysis: Daily Wage . This figure presents the mean of Daily Wage for target employees and control employees separately. Daily Wage 
is defined in Table 1 . Daily Wage is set to missing if Daily Wage of matched pair is missing in a given year. 
Fig. 4. Parallel trends analysis: Days Employed . This figure presents the mean of Days Employed for target employees and control employees separately. 
Days Employed is defined in Table 1 . The inverted-V pattern is a mechanical consequence of the requirement that employees in both groups have to be 
employed in the event year, but not necessarily before or after the event-year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.3. Job loss, unemployment, and career paths 
Comparing the results from establishment-level analy-
ses and individual-level analyses allows us to make some
tentative inferences about employees’ post-buyout career
paths. The long-term post-buyout separation rate of 18.75%
reported in Table 4 translates into an employment decline
of about 8.96%. Note that the establishment sample covers
more employees, as it includes unmatched employees, and
the separations include employees who were hired after
the buyout. Both groups do not appear in the individual-
employee sample. If we assume that these two groups
are not large or different enough to materially distort the
picture, we can conclude that about half of the employees
who are separated from buyout target firms find new
employment. To further analyze the importance of employees’ post-
buyout career paths, we repeat the analysis in Fig. 5 ,
Panel A and Panel B, adding other control variables for
career events. We add three dummy variables to Eq. (2) :
for switches to another establishment within the same
three-digit industry, for switches to another establishment
outside the employee’s three-digit industry, and if the
employee becomes unemployed. The variables always
capture the status of the employee five years after the
buyout. Panel C of Fig. 5 plots the estimates of θ k , which
capture the interactions of the event time dummies with
the target indicator, D ik × Target i . Panel B and Panel C are
drawn to the same scale to make them comparable. After
controlling for career-path events, the PE buyouts are
not associated with individual-level declines of income,
wages, and employment. Hence, career path events can
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Fig. 5. The impact of private equity buyouts on wages and employment. The figure plots the coefficients θ k on the interaction terms D ik ×Target i from 
ordinary least squares regressions of Earnings, Daily Wage, and Days Employed on a difference-in-differences setup and control variables as in Eq. (2) . In 
Panel B, we use logarithmic transformations of the dependent variable. In Panel C, the regressions include dummy variables indicating switches to another 
establishment within the same three-digit industry, switches to another establishment outside the employee’s three-digit industry, and unemployment. D ik 
is a dummy variable that is one for observations k years after the event-year, where k runs from five years before the buyout ( t − 5) to five years after the 
buyout ( t + 5 ). The dependent variables are in logs and defined in Table 1 . Regressions control for person fixed effects and calendar-year fixed effects. 
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 account for the long-term post-buyout decline of income
and employment. 
4. Who benefits and who loses after buyouts? 
In this section, we analyze how different groups of
employees fare after buyouts. Our discussion is guided
by three groups of theories that have been proposed in
the literature on buyouts, each of which identifies em-
ployees with certain characteristics as likely losers or
beneficiaries from buyouts. Section 4.2 analyzes organi-
zational streamlining, and Section 4.3 investigates dif-
ferent variants of the technological-modernization argu-
ment. Finally, in Section 4.4 , we address the question of
whether private equity buyouts are primarily a mecha-
nism to transfer wealth from employees to shareholders
and to what extent they could breach implicit employment
guarantees. 
4.1. Methodology 
All hypotheses we investigate in this section make con-
trasting predictions on the development of wages and em-
ployment for specific subgroups of employees relative to
each other and identify several factors, such as workers’
age, skill level, and the specificity of their human cap-
ital. We extend the methodologies of Sections 3.1 and
3.2 and incorporate employee characteristics into analyses
at the establishment and the individual level. Each hypoth-
esis identifies groups of employees who are more likely
to suffer im pairments of their human capital after buy-
outs. We refer to these characteristics as risk factors. For
each group, we repeat the establishment-level analysis in
Table 4 and test whether separation (hiring) rates after
buyouts are particularly high (low) for groups of employ-
ees considered to be at risk in buyouts. All establishment-
level analyses for groups of employees are presented in
Table 5 for the period from the event-year to two years
after the buyout. Table 6 provides the same analysis for
rates calculated until five years after the buyout. Columns
1 to 3 report the θ coefficients from Eq. (1) for growth,
separation, and hiring rates, respectively. Columns 4 to 6
of Panel A show tests for the differences between the
group shown and all other employees, e.g., all managers
and all non-managers. Columns 4 to 6 of Panel B show
tests for the differences between the highest and lowest
group. For example, the coefficient in Column 4 for Low
Wage shows the difference between the estimates for High
Wage - Low Wage and a t -test for whether this differ-
ence is significantly different from zero. For 12 of the 15
subgroups in Table 6 , above-average (below-average) sep-
aration rates go along with above-average (below-average)
hiring rates, i.e., departures by a certain category of em-
ployees is associated with increased hiring in the same
category. 
We perform individual-level triple-difference analyses,
in which we interact the target indicator and event-time
dummies with risk factors that identify the respective sub-
groups of employees. We build on Eq. (2) and estimate the
triple-difference equation  it = αi + γt + 
k =+5 ∑ 
k = −5 
δk D ik + T arget i ×
k =+5 ∑ 
k = −5 
θk D ik + RF f i 
×
k =+5 ∑ 
k = −5 
λk D ik + T arget i × RF f i ×
k =+5 ∑ 
k = −5 
ηk D ik + ε ik . (3)
The coefficients of interest in Eq. (3) are the ηk s on the
triple interaction of Target , the event dummies, and the
risk factor, which measure by how much target employ-
ees characterized by risk factor RF f differ from control em-
ployees with the same risk factor and by how much target
employees characterized by risk factor RF f differ from tar-
get employees not characterized by this risk factor. We run
each regression for all three dependent variables, once in
euros ( Earnings, Daily Wage , Columns 1, 3) or days ( Days
Employed , Column 5) and once in logarithms (Columns 2,
4, 6). All individual-level analyses based on Eq. (3) are pre-
sented in Table 7 . We report the estimates of only η2 and
η5 to be consistent with the establishment analysis and to
conserve space. In Table OA9 of the Online Appendix, we
report all coefficient estimates for period t to period t + 5
for all risk factors yielding significant results. As before, we
cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
4.2. Organizational streamlining 
One strand of the LBO literature sees PE buyouts as an
organizational form that rivals the public corporation with
dispersed shareholders ( Jensen, 1989; Kaplan, 1989 ). This
literature characterizes private equity firms as lean, de-
centralized organizations and argues that buyouts replace
governance by direct monitoring with governance through
high-powered incentives ( Jensen, 1989; Lichtenberg and
Siegel, 1990 ). For example, if top executives prefer a “quiet
life” ( Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003 ), they can avoid
confrontations with employees, pay higher wages, and fa-
vor middle management to keep conflicts from arising in
their immediate work environment ( Cronqvist et al., 2009 ).
If buyout firms address these agency problems, buyout tar-
gets should reverse these trends. Based on these notions,
we expect buyout targets to streamline their organizational
structure by reducing the layers of management and creat-
ing a leaner organization. We hypothesize that these mea-
sures will fall disproportionately on white-collar workers
and managers and expect a general decline in employ-
ment for these groups. Our data set includes two variables
that allow us to analyze organizational restructuring. Man-
ager is an indicator variable for those employees who have
an executive or middle management position (occupational
group 10 in Table 3 ). White Collar is an indicator variable
for white-collar workers (occupational groups 8, 9, and 10),
which form 28.5% of our sample ( Table 3 ). Managers are a
subset of white-collar employees and account for 3.1% of
the sample and 11% of white-collar employees. 
Table 5 shows that the short-term growth rate for
white-collar workers is lower, reflecting a separation rate
that is significantly higher (at the 10% level) than that
for non-white-collar workers. The long-term effects in
Table 6 point in the same direction but are not statistically
significant. We observe economically and statistically sig-
nificant increases in the long-term hiring and separation
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Table 5 
Establishment-level and group-specific employee flows from t to t + 2 . 
This table replicates the analysis of Table 4 for specific groups. Rates are calculated over period t to period 
t + 2 ; i.e., growth rates are computed over a three-year period from the end of t − 1 to the end of t + 2 . All 
variables are defined in Table 1 . Wage terciles (low, medium, high) are based on Daily Wage . High and low 
splits are based on the median. Columns 1 to 3 report the coefficients θ from Regression 1 with growth rates 
(Column 1), separation rates (Column 2) and hiring rates (Column 3) as the dependent variable. Columns 4 to 6 
provide tests for differences between groups of employees. In Panel A, the test is for whether these groups are 
different from their complement, e.g., White Collar minus all non-white-collar employees. In Panel B, the com- 
parison is always for the difference between the highest and lowest quantile, e.g., High Wage minus Low Wage . 
The number of observations varies per group because observations are missing when the establishment does 
not have at least one employee of the respective group and one point in time. The maximum number of obser- 
vations is 24,700 ( White Collar ), and the minimum number is 11,364 ( Manager ). Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. t -statistics are provided below the coefficient estimates. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Occupational groups 
From t to t + 2 Group - all other employees 
Empl. Growth Separation Hiring Empl. Growth Separation Hiring 
Rate [ θ ( g )] Rate [ θ ( s )] Rate [ θ ( h )] Rate [ θ ( g )] Rate [ θ ( s )] Rate [ θ ( h )] 
Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
White Collar −0.0468 ∗∗ 0.0930 ∗∗∗ 0.0462 ∗∗ −0.0452 0.0534 ∗ 0.0078 
−2.03 −1.29 1.67 0.29 
Manager −0.0248 0.0725 ∗ 0.0477 ∗ −0.0068 0.0137 0.0065 
−0.65 1.95 1.77 −0.16 0.33 0.21 
IT-Related Job −0.0313 0.0636 ∗∗∗ 0.0323 ∗∗ −0.0303 0.0100 −0.0202 
−1.52 3.03 2.12 −0.93 0.31 −0.73 
IT-Integrated job 0.0213 0.0453 0.0666 ∗∗ 0.0537 ∗ −0.0163 0.0374 
0.99 1.58 2.37 1.72 −0.47 1.14 
Panel B: Group splits 
From t to t + 2 High - low 
Empl. Growth Separation Hiring Empl. Growth Separation Hiring 
Rate [ θ ( g )] Rate [ θ ( s )] Rate [ θ ( h )] Rate [ θ ( g )] Rate [ θ ( s )] Rate [ θ ( h )] 
Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Low Wage −0.0440 0.1160 ∗∗∗ 0.0720 ∗∗ 0.0424 −0.0800 ∗ −0.0376 
−1.15 3.06 2.51 0.88 −1.74 −1.06 
Medium Wage −0.0146 0.0604 ∗ 0.0458 ∗∗∗
−0.40 1.91 2.70 
High Wage −0.0016 0.0360 0.0344 
−0.06 1.38 1.63 
Low Routine Job −0.0295 0.0768 ∗∗∗ 0.0473 ∗∗ 0.0152 −0.0310 −0.0157 
−1.39 3.57 2.43 0.48 −1.02 −0.62 
High Routine Job −0.0143 0.0458 ∗∗ 0.0316 ∗
−0.61 2.15 1.92 
Low Offshorable Job −0.0111 0.0576 ∗∗∗ 0.0465 ∗∗ −0.0204 0.0119 −0.0084 
−0.54 2.62 2.42 −0.59 0.39 −0.30 
High Offshorable Job −0.0315 0.0695 ∗∗∗ 0.0381 ∗
−1.14 3.25 1.92 
Young −0.0090 0.0466 ∗∗ 0.0376 ∗∗ −0.0147 0.0106 −0.0041 
−0.41 2.35 2.09 −0.46 0.37 −0.18 
Old −0.0237 0.0572 ∗∗∗ 0.0335 ∗∗
−1.03 2.74 2.25 
Low Tenure −0.0220 0.0449 ∗ 0.0229 0.0353 −0.0461 −0.0108 
−0.73 1.78 1.12 0.85 −1.24 −0.47 
High Tenure 0.0133 −0.0012 0.0121 
0.46 −0.04 1.14 rates and a low replacement rate for white-collar workers, 
which results in a substantial long-term decline of 11.82% 
in white-collar employment. Evidence shows that buyout 
investors streamline the administration of the firm after 
the buyout, especially during the first two years. The short- 
term results for managers in Table 5 point in the same di- 
rection but are less precisely estimated and statistically not 
significantly different from those for other employees. The 
long-term point estimates for managers for all rates re- 
ported in Table 6 are low, about half of those for the whole sample, and statistically insignificant. Some evidence exists 
for an increase in short-term turnover of middle managers, 
but no evidence emerges for a reduction in the layers of 
management. 
Table 7 shows the individual-level results for managers 
(Regression 1) and white-collar employees (Regression 2). 
We observe an economically dramatic decline in long-term 
Earnings for managers by 29.4 log points ( € 2,019), which 
is entirely driven by a decline in employment ( −14 . 4 
log points or 8.36 days). These effects are statistically 
M. Antoni, E. Maug and S. Obernberger / Journal of Financial Economics 133 (2019) 634–657 649 
Table 6 
Establishment-level and group-specific employee flows from t to t + 5 . 
This table replicates the analysis of Table 4 for specific groups. Rates are calculated over period t to period 
t + 5 ; i.e., growth rates are computed over a six-year period from the end of t − 1 to the end of t + 5 . All vari- 
ables are defined in Table 1 . Wage terciles (low, medium, high) are based on Daily Wage . High and low splits 
are based on the median. Columns 1 to 3 report the coefficients θ from Regression 1 with growth rates (Col- 
umn 1), separation rates (Column 2) and hiring rates (Column 3) as the dependent variable. Columns 4 to 6 
provide tests for differences between groups of employees. In Panel A, the test is for whether these groups are 
different from their complement, e.g., White Collar minus all non-white-collar employees. In Panel B, the com- 
parison is always for the difference between the highest and lowest quantile, e.g., High Wage minus Low Wage . 
The number of observations varies per group because observations are missing when the establishment does 
not have at least one employee of the respective group and one point in time. The maximum number of obser- 
vations is 24,700 ( White Collar ), and the minimum number is 11,364 ( Manager ). Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. t -statistics are provided below the coefficient estimates. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Occupational groups 
From t to t + 5 Group – all other employees 
Empl. Growth Separation Hiring Empl. Growth Separation Hiring 
Rate [ θ ( g )] Rate [ θ ( s )] Rate [ θ ( h )] Rate [ θ ( g )] Rate [ θ ( s )] Rate [ θ ( h )] 
Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
White Collar −0.1182 ∗∗ 0.2013 ∗∗∗ 0.0831 ∗∗ −0.0586 0.0477 −0.0109 
−2.38 3.57 2.17 −0.94 0.64 −0.20 
Manager −0.0266 0.0809 0.0543 0.0590 −0.1023 −0.0433 
−0.32 0.69 0.97 0.66 −0.81 −0.65 
IT-Related Job −0.0819 ∗∗ 0.1521 ∗∗∗ 0.0702 ∗∗ 0.0 0 02 −0.0701 −0.0698 
−1.96 2.92 2.28 0.00 −0.82 −1.15 
IT-Integrated Job −0.0341 0.1877 ∗ 0.1536 ∗∗ 0.0674 0.0119 0.0793 
−0.70 1.94 2.29 1.08 0.11 1.03 
Panel B: Group splits 
From t to t + 5 High–low 
Empl. Growth Separation Hiring Empl. Growth Separation Hiring 
Rate [ θ ( g )] Rate [ θ ( s )] Rate [ θ ( h )] Rate [ θ ( g )] Rate [ θ ( s )] Rate [ θ ( h )] 
Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Low Wage −0.1276 ∗∗∗ 0.3393 ∗∗∗ 0.2117 ∗∗∗ 0.0660 −0.2128 ∗∗ −0.1468 ∗
−2.95 4.57 2.63 1.00 −2.43 −1.73 
Medium Wage −0.0949 ∗ 0.0449 ∗∗∗ 0.0211 ∗∗∗
−1.92 3.49 2.89 
High Wage −0.0616 0.1265 ∗∗∗ 0.0649 ∗∗
−1.23 2.73 2.38 
Low Routine Job −0.0977 ∗∗ 0.1979 ∗∗∗ 0.1002 ∗∗∗ 0.0335 −0.0651 −0.0316 
−2.24 3.96 2.79 0.56 −0.99 −0.68 
High Routine Job −0.0642 0.1328 ∗∗∗ 0.0686 ∗∗
−1.59 3.09 2.31 
Low Offshorable Job −0.0934 ∗∗ 0.2079 ∗∗∗ 0.1145 ∗∗∗ 0.0342 −0.0900 −0.0558 
−2.26 3.89 2.86 0.55 −1.30 −1.11 
High Offshorable Job −0.0592 0.1179 ∗∗∗ 0.0587 ∗
−1.29 2.68 1.94 
Young −0.0757 ∗∗ 0.1705 ∗∗∗ 0.0948 ∗∗ −0.0157 −0.0030 −0.0187 
−2.06 3.60 2.17 −0.29 −0.05 −0.38 
Old −0.0914 ∗∗ 0.1675 ∗∗∗ 0.0761 ∗∗∗
−2.36 4.00 3.33 
Low Tenure −0.1140 ∗∗∗ 0.2069 ∗∗∗ 0.0929 ∗ 0.1195 ∗ −0.1950 ∗∗∗ −0.0755 
−2.62 3.74 1.74 1.94 −2.82 −1.38 
High Tenure 0.0055 0.0119 0.0174 
0.13 0.29 1.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 significant. The post-buyout experience of white-collar
workers is also negative, with a long-term employment
decline of 8.0 log points (5.4 days) and a weakly signifi-
cant long-term decline in earnings by € 702. We conclude
that the adverse implications for managers and white-
collar workers after buyouts are severe and significantly
worse than those for other target employees. The short-
term establishment-level results provide some evidence for
a reduction in administrative staff, but not for a reduction
in the layers of management. We suggest that the negative
 individual-level results for managers should be attributed
to the greater difficulties they experience in finding new
employment, probably from a stigma associated with los-
ing their jobs at the target. 
4.3. Technological modernization 
This section investigates the technological-
modernization argument. Technological change can be
beneficial for employees if their skills are complementary
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Table 7 
Individual-level analyses of employee characteristics. 
The table presents ordinary least squares regressions of Earnings, Daily Wage , and Days Employed in a triple-difference setup from 
Eq. (3) . The dependent variables are in logarithms in Columns 2, 4, and 6. Each specification includes a risk factor, which is measured 
in the year prior to the buyout announcement. We only report the estimates of η2 and η5 . In Panel A, the risk factors are Manager 
(Regression 1) and White Collar (Regression 2) . In Panel B, we analyze wages by entering two risk factors in Eq. (3) , Low Wage and 
Medium Wage, which denote the first and second tercile of Daily Wage , respectively. In Panel C, the risk factors are Routine Job (Regres- 
sion 1) and Offshorable Job (Regression 2). In Panel D, the risk factors are IT-Related Job and IT-Integrated Job. In Panel E, the risk factors 
are Old (Regression 1), an indicator set equal to one if an employee’s age is above the median sample age, and High Tenure (Regression 
2), an indicator set equal to one if an employee’s Firm Tenure is above the sample median. The numerical variables are defined in 
Table 1 , and the categorical variables are defined in Table 3 . Each specification contains individual and year fixed effects. The number 
of observations for Earnings and Days Employed is 2,128,798 = 152,057 target employees ×2 (control employees) ×7 (event-years). The 
number of observations for Daily Wage is 1,929,354. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t -statistics are provided below the 
coefficient estimates. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable 
Earnings Earnings Daily Wage Daily Wage Days Empl. Days Empl. 
(euro) (ln) (euro) (ln) (days) (ln) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Organizational streamlining 
Regression 1: Managers versus all others 
D i 2 × Target ×Manager −965.67 ∗ −0.071 −0.81 −0.007 −2.38 −0.028 
−1.76 −0.97 −0.80 −0.82 −0.88 −0.70 
D i 5 × Target ×Manager −2019.40 ∗∗∗ −0.294 ∗∗ −0.32 −0.006 −8.36 ∗ −0.144 ∗∗
−2.59 −2.36 −0.36 −0.61 −1.91 −2.12 
Regression 2: White-collar employees versus all others 
D i 2 × Target ×White Collar −455.01 ∗ −0.123 ∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.007 −4.35 ∗∗ −0.065 ∗
−1.67 −3.11 −0.09 −0.94 −2.26 −1.90 
D i 5 × Target ×White Collar −701.89 ∗ −0.151 ∗∗ 0.07 −0.010 −5.40 ∗∗ −0.080 ∗
−1.95 −2.22 0.10 −0.99 −2.16 −1.73 
Panel B: Technological change 
Regression 1: Wage terciles 
D i 2 × Target × Low Wage 975.53 ∗∗∗ 0.005 0.92 0.010 1.01 −0.007 
2.78 0.09 1.37 1.17 0.39 −0.16 
D i 5 × Target × Low Wage 1258.87 ∗∗ 0.018 2.04 ∗ 0.016 −0.52 −0.009 
2.01 0.15 1.77 1.35 −0.13 −0.13 
D i 2 × Target ×Medium Wage 698.65 ∗∗∗ 0.075 ∗∗ 0.56 0.005 1.71 0.030 
2.97 2.18 0.93 0.92 1.41 1.59 
D i 5 × Target ×Medium Wage 490.58 0.021 0.62 0.005 −0.34 0.002 
1.36 0.32 0.74 0.75 −0.15 0.06 
Panel C: Routinization and offshorability 
Regression 1: Employees with a routine job versus all others 
D i 2 × Target ×Routine Job 459.79 ∗∗ 0.053 ∗ −0.08 −0.002 2.57 ∗ 0.033 
2.27 1.93 −0.15 −0.30 1.93 1.52 
D i 5 × Target ×Routine Job 586.16 ∗∗ 0.067 −0.12 −0.003 2.30 0.030 
2.09 1.47 −0.20 −0.32 1.33 1.00 
Regression 2: Employees with an offshorable job versus all others 
D i 2 × Target ×Offshorable Job −229.39 −0.020 −0.15 0.002 −0.57 −0.009 
−0.86 −0.52 −0.28 0.23 −0.37 −0.33 
D i 5 × Target ×Offshorable Job −50.28 0.010 0.14 0.001 0.37 0.014 
−0.15 0.14 0.20 0.06 0.16 0.34 
Panel D: Information Technology expertise 
Regression 1: Employees in jobs with above-median use of digital tools 
D i 2 × Target × IT-Related Job −145.44 −0.045 0.25 −0.004 −1.95 −0.023 
−0.75 −1.56 0.54 −0.64 −1.28 −0.97 
D i 5 × Target × IT-Related Job −280.20 −0.018 −0.06 −0.008 −1.07 −0.006 
−1.03 −0.36 −0.10 −1.13 −0.56 −0.19 
Regression 2: Employees in jobs with above-median use of IT-integrated tools 
D i 2 × Target× IT-Integrated Job 286.75 0.034 0.26 0.005 1.16 0.009 
1.30 1.09 0.55 0.78 0.89 0.45 
D i 5 × Target× IT-Integrated Job 175.55 0.031 −0.10 0.005 1.35 0.018 
0.54 0.53 −0.18 0.66 0.64 0.54 
Panel E: Transfer of wealth 
Regression 1: Employees with above-median age versus all others 
D i 2 × Target ×Old −696.40 ∗∗∗ −0.098 ∗∗∗ −0.73 ∗∗ −0.008 −4.00 ∗∗∗ −0.050 ∗∗
−3.92 −3.21 −2.50 −1.44 −3.17 −2.53 
D i 5 × Target ×Old −807.04 ∗∗ −0.184 ∗∗∗ −1.15 ∗∗∗ −0.018 ∗∗ −6.19 ∗∗ −0.106 ∗∗∗
−2.44 −2.61 −2.61 −2.10 −2.54 −2.71 
Regression 2: Employees with above-median firm tenure versus all others 
D i 2 × Target ×High Tenure −127.26 0.031 −0.30 −0.002 0.35 0.019 
−0.50 0.79 −0.57 −0.38 0.20 0.68 
D i 5 × Target ×High Tenure −413.22 −0.019 −1.05 −0.009 −1.14 −0.014 
−0.94 −0.20 −1.34 −1.02 −0.35 −0.26 
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14 Offshoring is, strictly speaking, not a technology, but the literature on 
job polarization relates the offshorability of jobs to their technological as- 
pects and skill requirements, so we discuss offshorability in this context. 
15 We follow the description in the Online Appendix of Goos et al. 
(2014) , which is available at https://assets.aeaweb.org/assets/production/ 
articles-attachments/aer/app/10408/20111536 _ app.pdf . to the new technology. Then, employees become more
productive. A new technology can also have negative ef-
fects if it substitutes for employees’ skills and depreciates
their human capital. The technological change argument
relies on this notion of technology skills complemen-
tarity and, therefore, does not make general predictions
on how employees should be affected by technological
change and how PE buyouts that foster technological
change should affect employees. Instead, different types
of technological change can affect employees differently.
The recent literature sees PE buyouts as vehicles that
raise investment in information technology ( Agrawal and
Tambe, 2016 ) or overcome firms’ resistance to adapt to
trends, such as skill-biased technological change, off-
shoring and routinization of jobs, which in turn lead to
job polarization ( Olsson and Tåg, 2017 ). In this section,
we analyze whether these trends can explain the over-
all results we show in Section 3 for employment and
wages. 
The skill-biased technological change hypothesis at-
tributes the rising wage inequality in industrialized coun-
tries to technological progress, which has benefited high-
skilled workers, whose skills are complementary to new
technologies, but caused a relative reduction in wages for
low-skilled workers (see Katz and Autor (1999) for a sur-
vey). If private equity firms overcome resistance to this
trend, then the costs of PE buyouts can fall disproportion-
ately on employees with lower education and skill levels,
whose wages and employment fall relative to employees
with higher education and skill levels. 
We use pre-buyout wage levels to stratify employees in
Tables 5 –7 . We divide all employees who are employed for
the full year evenly into terciles according to Daily Wage :
the lowest (medium, highest) income tercile is labeled as
low (medium, high) wage. With this classification, we have
two risk factors in Eq. (3) , one for Low Wage and one for
Medium Wage. 
The SBTC hypothesis predicts employment and income
should decline for the lowest group. The establishment-
level results in Tables 5 and 6 are partially consistent with
the SBTC hypothesis. The short-term and long-term sep-
aration rates for low-wage target employees are higher
than those for control employees, and they are statisti-
cally and economically much higher compared with high-
wage employees. These results support the SBTC hypothe-
sis. Most of the increased separations are compensated by
more hiring of low-wage employees by buyout targets, and
the long-term buyout effect on hiring is higher by 14.68%
and significant at the 10% level. As a result, the post-
buyout employment decline of low-wage employees is only
moderately larger, and statistically not distinguishable from
that of high-wage employees. Because the SBTC hypothe-
sis predicts that high-wage employees displace low-wage
employees, our results offer at best modest support to the
hypothesis that buyouts in our sample foster SBTC. Instead
of observing the displacement of low-wage employees by
high-wage employees, we find higher turnover only within
the group of low-wage employees, for which there is no
obvious explanation. To explore this question further, we
investigate alternative stratifications of employees based
on education and a classification of occupational skill lev-els (see Table OA10 in the Online Appendix, Panel A) but
cannot find any support for the prediction that the separa-
tion (employment growth) rates for low-education or low-
skill employees are lower (higher) than those for, respec-
tively, highly educated or high-skill employees. 
At the individual employee level, we find that the
triple interactions for the short term and the long term
( D i 2 × Target × Low Wage and D i 5 × Target × Low Wage ) both
show a significant and positive employment change for
low-wage target employees if we measure Earnings in eu-
ros. All other results in Table 7 are statistically insignifi-
cant, except for one coefficient for Daily Wage, which has
the wrong sign. Hence, we cannot find support for the
SBTC hypothesis at the individual level, probably because
low-wage employees find it easy to find new employment
after separations from the target. 
More recent research notes inconsistencies between the
SBTC hypothesis and developments in labor markets (e.g.,
Card and DiNardo (2002) ; Goos et al., 2014; Mishel et al.,
2013 ). Instead, some studies observe that employment
shares rise in the highest-wage and lowest-wage occupa-
tions, at the expense of mid-level occupations (e.g., Goos
and Manning, 2007 ), a pattern described as job polariza-
tion. The reason for this development is seen in the fact
that low-wage manual jobs (e.g., health workers, janitors,
security guards) are more difficult to replace with comput-
erized technologies or cannot be outsourced to countries
with lower labor costs (offshorable jobs). Medium-skilled
workers who perform routine tasks can see their jobs re-
placed by technology or outsourced to low-wage countries
(e.g., Blinder, 2009; Blinder and Krueger, 2009 ). 
Following Olsson and Tåg (2017) , we hypothesize
that PE buyouts overcome resistance to offshoring and
routinization and ask whether employees with routine
or offshorable jobs fare worse after buyouts. 14 We ap-
ply the definitions of Goos et al. (2014) to categorize
jobs as routine or offshorable. 15 At the individual level,
we find positive effects and, hence, the opposite of the
predicted signs, which are statistically significant for
the association of routinization with Earnings and Days
Employed . All other effects are statistically insignificant
( Table 7 ). The establishment-level analyses corroborate
these findings ( Tables 5 and 6 ). The long-term separation
and growth rates are numerically higher but statistically
indistinguishable for employees with less routinized and
offshorable jobs. Thus, the analyses neither at the indi-
vidual nor at the establishment level offer supporting
evidence for the prediction that buyouts foster offshoring
and routinization, and there is even some evidence to the
contrary. 
Job polarization predicts negative developments for
the medium stratum of the labor market relative to
the other groups. We can check if the results for the
medium-wage employees conform to the predictions of
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 the job-polarization hypothesis. The individual-level anal- 
ysis shows that the triple interactions for these groups 
have mostly positive signs, although only two are sta- 
tistically significant at the 10% level ( Table 7 , Panel B). 
Establishment-level results are consistent with this result 
as separation and hiring rates are higher for low-wage em- 
ployees than for medium-wage employees, although the 
differences between medium-wage and either high-wage 
or low-wage employees are never statistically significant. 
Our results offer no support for the job polarization hy- 
pothesis. 
Agrawal and Tambe (2016) argue that PE buyouts foster 
the investments in IT and the implementation of IT-based 
technologies. Based on their analysis, we expect that target 
employees with more IT exposure become more valuable 
after the buyout and that their wages and employment 
increases compared with the control group. To investigate 
this question, we obtain access to IAB data about job 
classifications based on the tools each job requires ( Genz 
et al., 2019 ). Tools are categorized into three categories as 
IT-Integrated Tools , defined as tools “that are electronically 
based or supported and that are explicitly dedicated to an 
industry 4.0 or services 4.0 feature, such as 3D printers, 
machine learning software or mobile robots,” IT-Aided 
Tools , which “are electronically based or supported, such 
as computers, printers, electronic machines” but not clas- 
sified as IT-integrated, and Non-IT Tools ( Genz et al., 2019 , 
p. 5). Genz et al. (2019) then establish the proportion of 
tools that can be classified as IT-integrated or IT-aided 
used in each occupation. Higher scores on the IT-aided 
tools index describe jobs with a broad skill set, and higher 
scores on the IT-integrated tools index describe jobs with 
higher skill requirements. We use these proportions and 
say that all employees who have a job with an above- 
median score of the sum of IT-aided and IT-integrated 
tools as having an IT-Related Job . Far fewer employees use 
IT-integrated tools, so the median of this score is zero. We 
say an employee has an IT-Integrated job if at least one of 
the tools used in that job is IT-integrated. Both variables 
describe jobs with significant exposure to computerized 
technologies. 
We use the classification of jobs as IT-related and 
non-IT-related, respectively, as IT-integrated and non-IT- 
integrated and repeat the analyses for this sample split. 
The point estimates for long-term hiring rates and net 
employment growth in Table 6 suggest that buyout firms 
hire more IT-integrated and IT-related workers and that 
net employment growth is larger for the former group 
compared with all other employees, but the estimates 
are too imprecise to be statistically significant. Short-term 
net employment growth is statistically significantly higher 
(10% level) for IT-integrated jobs. Panel D of Table 7 re- 
ports the individual-level results, all of which are in- 
significant. Target employees who use IT tools, defined 
narrowly or more broadly, do not have different wages 
or employment levels after buyouts compared with a 
matched control group and compared with non-IT em- 
ployees. We observe additional hiring and job growth 
for IT-integrated jobs, consistent with prior literature, 
but no effect on the human capital of the affected 
employees. 4.4. Transfers of wealth 
A long-standing debate on buyouts and the activity of 
private equity firms is whether they create shareholder 
value primarily through transfers of wealth (see the dis- 
cussion at the beginning of the Introduction) or whether 
the adverse consequences for employees should be seen as 
a side effect of a process of modernization and creative de- 
struction ( Kaplan, 1989; Davis et al., 2014 ). In this section, 
we try to shed some light on this discussion. Empirically, 
distinguishing between intended effects and side effects is 
impossible. Hence, we analyze more specific processes as- 
sociated with the transfer-of-wealth mechanism. 
The transfer-of-wealth argument was articulated most 
clearly by Shleifer and Summers (1988) , who argue that 
firms offer long-term employment insurance to employ- 
ees. Employees rely on managers and owners to honor 
these unwritten agreements, which are credible, e.g., be- 
cause managers and owners pass through loyalty filters 
( Akerlof, 1983 ) in their career that align their preferences 
with those of the employees. A change in ownership can 
undermine the commitment to such implicit contracts if 
the new owners do not feel bound by agreements the pre- 
vious owners entered into with the employees. 
The literature has two different arguments on transfers 
of wealth, both of which build on the notion of implicit 
contracts. The first relies on risk sharing within firms, and 
the second relies on firm-specific human capital. Because 
these arguments have different implications for employ- 
ment and wages, we develop and test them separately. 
4.4.1. Risk sharing and dynamic wage contracts 
According to the risk-sharing argument, firms provide 
employment and wage insurance to employees in exchange 
for lower wages ( Azariadis, 1975; Baily 1974 ). The dynamic 
version of this argument implies that wage profiles are ris- 
ing with employees’ age. Insurance implies that wages can- 
not be cut when productivity falls, but voluntary employ- 
ment implies that wages increase when productivity rises, 
resulting in a ratchet effect ( Harris and Holmstrom, 1982 ). 
Wages can then rise in excess of employees’ marginal pro- 
ductivity toward the end of their careers, and they can 
rise above employees’ productivity. Firms extract expected 
rents, e.g., through lower wages, at the beginning of em- 
ployment relations ( Ray, 2002 ). A similar argument follows 
from Lazear (1979) , who develops a model in which firms 
elicit unobservable effort in exchange for rising wage pro- 
files. If the new owners after PE buyouts would renege on 
these implicit agreements, they would lay off or cut the 
wages of older employees. 
In Regression 1 of Table 7 , Panel E, we use Age as a risk
factor and split the sample at the median age of all em- 
ployees (42 years). We find statistically and economically 
strong effects. The long-term decline of Earnings of older 
buyout employees is larger by 18.4 log points, or € 807 
(2.3% of the median wage), compared with older control 
employees or with younger target employees. Unlike for 
other groups of employees, we observe a significantly neg- 
ative wage effect for older employees, which compounds 
the negative employment effect. 
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 Next, we investigate whether older employees of PE tar-
gets experience higher separation rates after buyouts. The
theoretical argument implies that PE buyers replace older
employees who earn above their productivity with younger
employees, who earn less. Such a policy would result in
higher post-buyout separation rates for older target em-
ployees compared with control employees and higher post-
buyout hiring rates for younger employees. Tables 5 and
6 show that this is not the case. The long-term post-buyout
separation rate is even slightly higher for younger tar-
get employees compared with older target employees, al-
though this difference is almost zero. The difference for
hiring rates has the predicted sign (young: 9.48%; old:
7.61%) but is small and statistically insignificant. Hence, the
human resource policies of private equity investors do not
appear to be biased against older employees. In all like-
lihood, the negative individual-level results for older em-
ployees should be attributed to older employees not find-
ing new employment after losing employment at the target
firm. We could cast the discussion of dynamic wage pro-
files in terms of tenure with the firm instead of age, but
the discussion in Section 4.4.2 shows that this would not
affect our conclusions. 
4.4.2. Firm-specific human capital 
Shleifer and Summers (1988) formulate a different ver-
sion of the transfer-of-wealth argument. They hypothe-
size that firms offer long-term employment protection to
employees to provide incentives for investments in firm-
specific human capital. New owners can abrogate these
contracts and take advantage of employees with firm-
specific human capital by forcing them to accept lower
wages. The two testable implications of this hypothesis are
that (1) PE buyouts lead to a reduction in wages for em-
ployees who continue to be employed by the target firm
(see Rosett (1990) and Gokhale et al. (1995) for tests of
a related argument on takeovers) and that (2) these wage
cuts fall disproportionately on employees with more firm-
specific human capital. 
We test the first implication, i.e., the reduction of wages
for continuing employees, by performing a triple-difference
analysis at the individual level. We add interaction effects
with the dummy variable Leaver , which equals one for em-
ployees who leave their establishment between the end of
year t − 1 and the end of year t + 5 . We provide the re-
sults for the overall sample and for some of the pertinent
subgroups of employees in Table 8 . Table OA11 in the On-
line Appendix provides the same results for the shorter
period from t − 1 to t + 2 . Baseline growth rates of Earn-
ings and Daily Wage are consistently positive, and Days
Employed declines by 2.7 days per year. Most importantly,
changes for all three variables for target employees (in-
teraction Target i ×D i 5 ) in the whole sample, and for al-
most all subgroups, are economically and statistically in-
distinguishable from zero. The exception are employees
in the lowest wage tercile, who experience an increase
in Earnings ( € 440). Employees who stay with their es-
tablishments after PE buyouts do not lose, neither in ab-
solute terms nor in relative terms, compared with em-
ployees of non-PE targets, which is inconsistent with the
specific-human capital argument. Employees who leave thefirm (interaction D i 5 × Leaver i ) lose substantially in terms
of Earnings. This negative effect on leaving employees is
exacerbated for target employees, and the triple interac-
tion effect is significant for all seven groups of employ-
ees in Panel B of Table 8 . The results are quantitatively
strongest for employees in the highest wage tercile and for
managers. 
To address the specific human capital argument more
directly, we follow the literature (e.g., Poletaev and Robin-
son, 2008 ) and measure the specificity of human capital
by individuals’ tenure in their current job. We use the me-
dian tenure in our sample to distinguish between high and
low tenure. Regression 2 in Table 7 , Panel E, presents the
individual-level results. None of the coefficients is signifi-
cant, suggesting that the specificity of human capital can-
not explain the differences for employment and earnings
of buyout employees compared with control employees.
For the establishment-level results in Table 6 , the long-
term separation rate for low-tenure employees is 20.69%
compared with only 1.19% for high-tenure employees, and
the difference is significant at the 1% level. These results
are consistent with a special protection of high-tenure em-
ployees, which is implied by insider-outsider theories (see
Lindbeck and Snower, 1986; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988 )
that build on the notion that insiders are more entrenched
than outsiders, an arrangement that is apparently immune
to private equity interventions. 
To summarize, we cannot find support for any of the
implications of the transfer-of-wealth view we can test. No
evidence emerges that PE targets extract quasi-rents from
older employees by laying them off at a higher rate than
younger employees. Also, no evidence shows that PE buy-
outs benefit from the lock-in of employees with more firm-
specific human capital through lower wages, or at least
through lower wage growth. We are careful to add that
we test specific versions of the transfer-of-wealth argu-
ment. The losses of employment and earnings we show
can still involve some breach of implicit employment con-
tracts, which are not observable. We can test only specific
implications and not the broader questions of whether PE
buyers sever any implicit long-term employment guaran-
tees. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
We study the development of employment and wages
of a large sample of German employees whose firms
were acquired by private equity firms. Buyouts are fol-
lowed by a decline in employment and an increase in
employee turnover. Increases in separation and hiring
rates are strongly correlated across transactions and across
the groups of employees we study. Individual-level earn-
ings of buyout employees fall by € 980 five years af-
ter the buyout, which amounts to about 2.8% of median
earnings. 
When we analyze groups of employees with particular
characteristics, establishment-level results and individual-
level results often point in different directions. For exam-
ple, employees in the lowest wage tercile and those with
below-median tenure at the firm experience a higher inci-
dence of separations from the target after buyouts. These
654 M. Antoni, E. Maug and S. Obernberger / Journal of Financial Economics 133 (2019) 634–657 
Table 8 
Individual-level analyses of stayers and leavers. 
The table presents ordinary least squares regressions of Earnings, Daily Wage , and Days Employed in a triple-difference setup 
from Eq. (3) . Each specification includes an indicator variable Leaver , which is one if the employee leaves the target establishment 
at some point between t and t + 5 . We only report the estimates of γ 5 , θ5 , λ5 , and η5 . In Panel A, we report the results for 
regressions of Earnings, Daily Wage , and Days Employed and their logarithmic transformations for the whole sample . In Panel B, we 
report the results for regressions of Earnings for subsamples of employees. The numerical variables are defined in Table 1 , and the 
categorical variables are defined in Table 3 . Low Wage and High Wage denote the first and third tercile of Daily Wage , respectively. 
Each specification includes individual and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t -statistics are provided 
below the coefficient estimates. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Full sample 
Dependent variable 
Earnings Earnings Daily Wage Daily Wage Days Empl. Days Empl. 
(euro) (ln) (euro) (ln) (days) (ln) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
D i 5 5730.03 
∗∗∗ 0.176 ∗∗∗ 16.41 ∗∗∗ 0.149 ∗∗∗ −2.67 ∗∗ 0.024 
32.15 6.37 43.12 41.23 −2.46 1.54 
D i 5 × Target 75.17 0.0 0 0 0.33 0.003 −0.63 −0.003 
0.24 −0.01 0.39 0.52 −0.99 −0.47 
D i 5 × Leaver −12,786.66 ∗∗∗ −2.921 ∗∗∗ −6.13 ∗∗∗ −0.077 ∗∗∗ −100.63 ∗∗∗ −1.642 ∗∗∗
−41.28 −62.43 −18.70 −20.19 −61.11 −65.48 
D i 5 × Target × Leaver −1659.08 ∗∗ −0.380 ∗∗∗ −1.67 ∗ −0.0260 ∗∗ −12.84 ∗∗∗ −0.207 ∗∗∗
−2.26 −3.26 −1.73 −2.40 −3.21 −3.24 
Panel B: Subsamples, dependent variable: Earnings (euro) 
Subsample 
White Low High 
Collar Manager Young Old Wage Wage 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
D i 5 6137.76 
∗∗∗ 7301.13 ∗∗∗ 4106.66 ∗∗∗ 6944.50 ∗∗∗ 4468.62 ∗∗∗ 6653.27 ∗∗∗
34.19 13.58 21.10 42.35 32.19 24.27 
D i 5 × Target 150.56 −186.21 11.77 145.27 440.38 ∗∗ −156.32 
0.48 −0.37 0.04 0.39 1.97 −0.32 
D i 5 × Leaver −11,829.58 ∗∗∗ −21,631.17 ∗∗∗ −20,512.65 ∗∗∗ −6,348.54 ∗∗∗ −5,724.72 ∗∗∗ −20,094.56 ∗∗∗
−44.49 −26.96 −46.26 −34.13 −43.89 −31.74 
D i 5 × Target× Leaver −2,120.96 ∗∗ −3715.67 ∗∗∗ −1566.16 ∗ −1302.55 ∗∗ −1213.44 ∗∗∗ −2764.20 ∗∗
−2.54 −2.82 −1.80 −2.54 −2.93 −2.44 
Number of observations 609,504 57,190 1,024,373 1,104,425 709,499 709,597 
16 The record linkage was performed using methods developed by the 
German Record Linkage Center (GRLC; see http://www.record-linkage.de ). characteristics do not predict individual-level unemploy- 
ment and losses to employees’ long-term earnings. Man- 
agers and older employees experience large losses after 
buyouts, even though they do not experience higher sep- 
arations from the target compared with other employees. 
The employees who lose most after buyouts are those who 
seem to find it harder to find new employment, not those 
who experience a higher incidence of job loss after buy- 
outs. We infer that buyout investors replace employees 
based on characteristics such as ability, which are observ- 
able to managers after buyouts but not reflected in the em- 
ployee characteristics in our data. 
We find only limited evidence for theories that predict 
changes in the composition of the workforce after buy- 
outs. Some evidence shows that a disproportionate part 
of the decline in employment falls on white-collar work- 
ers, pointing to the creation of leaner firms through lay- 
ing off administrative staff. Similarly, some evidence shows 
net employment growth in jobs that require more IT skills. 
Other theories that propose changes in the composition 
of the workforce, e.g., those related to particular forms of 
technological change, have little or no explanatory power. 
We conclude that the first-order effects after buyouts are 
changes in the size and quality of the workforce, not a 
change in its overall composition. Appendix A 
This Appendix provides more detailed information 
about the record-linkage process ( Section A.1 ), the 
construction of some of the more complex variables 
( Section A.2 ), and the computation of growth rates, hiring 
rates, and separation rates ( Section A.3 ). 
A.1. Record linkage and clustering 
We link establishments to transactions based on com- 
pany names, because no common company identifiers ex- 
ist that would easily link our PE buyout sample to the 
Establishment History Panel. The BHP contains all estab- 
lishments in Germany with at least one dependent em- 
ployee at the reference date, June 30, of the respective 
year. We are using record linkage techniques (see Herzog 
et al., 2007 ) for the purpose of name-based matching using 
establishment names. 16 Establishment names consist of the 
company name, the legal form, and additional information. 
In principle, the linkage techniques create two standard- 
ized variables containing the company name and the firm’s 
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 legal form of incorporation for all data sets that need to be
linked. Based on these variables, we perform a record link-
age that includes the handling of exceptional cases such as
very common firm names or stand-alone establishments.
In-sample tests suggest that this procedure is very accu-
rate. 17 
The BHP represents the highest level of aggregation
of IAB data. The IAB does not provide data on the firm
level and does not track ownership or relations among es-
tablishments. To cluster standard errors at the firm level,
we apply the record linkage techniques by Herzog et al.
(2007) to generate a synthetic firm identifier from the uni-
verse of all establishments existing in IAB’s data in our
observation period. For the target establishments, we use
the initial record linkage of company names to establish-
ments, i.e., we group the 2420 establishments into 682
firm-level clusters. This approach yields more clusters than
deals because some deals involve several legally distinct
companies (e.g., multiple subsidiaries). Subsidiaries often
have distinct human resource policies and should, there-
fore, be treated separately. 18 Nevertheless, we alternatively
build clusters based on deals, i.e., we group the 2420 es-
tablishments into 511 deal-level clusters. We rerun our key
analyses in Tables 4 –7 using deal-level clustering (cf. Ta-
ble OA12 in the Online Appendix). Standard errors never
increase by more than 5% for any relevant coefficient, and
statistical significance remains unchanged. 
A.2. Variable construction 
Most variables in our analyses are derived from the
Integrated Employment Biographies database. The IEB
contains every dependent employee in Germany, i.e., all
regular employees since 1975 in West Germany and since
1992 in East Germany as well as all marginally employed
workers since 1999. 19 The data are structured in terms
of spells, i.e., employment relations, and the data source
reports starting and ending dates of these spells on a daily
basis. If employment relations continue into the following
calendar year, a notification is given by the employer at
the end of each year. The continued employment relation
is represented by a new spell in the following calendar
year. For categorical variables such as education, qualifica-
tion, and establishment affiliation, we use the information
from the latest spell in a calendar year. All variables except
nationality and gender are time-varying and can change
for the same individual during the observation period.
Numerical variables such as Earnings, Daily Wage , and Days
Employed are computed over both the full calendar year17 See Schäffler (2014) and Schild (2016) for a detailed description of 
the methods and data sources used to perform very similar linkages with 
IAB’s administrative establishment data. They demonstrate that the meth- 
ods we use are effective in linking IAB’s establishment data with external 
company-level data. 
18 A prominent example is Eurowings, a budget airline and wholly- 
owned subsidiary of Lufthansa, which offers lower pay to pilots and flight 
attendants. 
19 The IEB does not cover civil servants and the self-employed. These 
groups are irrelevant for the companies in our sample. For more details 
on the sources and structure of IAB’s administrative data, see Antoni et al. 
(2016) . 
 
 
 and all spells in the respective calendar year, regardless
of whether the spells refer to different employers or the
same employer. Earnings are top-coded, because wages
above a threshold ranging from € 51,0 0 0 in 1998 to €
70,0 0 0 in 2013 are exempt from certain social security
contributions. Maximum Earnings reported in the data
can nevertheless be higher because some individuals have
more than one job in a given year and social security con-
tributions are calculated for each job, even if the income
of all jobs combined exceeds the threshold. Numerical
variables such as Age and Tenure are determined on the
last day of the calendar year. 
The qualification variables presented in Table 3 and
used in subsequent analyses are derived from Blossfeld
(1987) . He classified jobs that are coded according to
the German Classification of Occupations 1988 (“Klassi-
fikation der Berufe 1988”) into 12 distinct major occupa-
tions. Table 1 in Blossfeld (1987 , p. 99) provides a de-
tailed overview on those 12 occupations and related In-
ternational Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)
codes. In Table 3 , we leave out agricultural occupations be-
cause our data set does not include individuals from this
group, and we merge technicians and engineers into one
group. 
For our establishment analysis, we aggregate the annu-
alized employment information of individuals at the estab-
lishment level. Every calendar year, we sum up or build
averages over all employees that were employed at an es-
tablishment at the end of the calendar year. Therefore,
changes in establishment-level employment are based on
changes from December 31 of the previous year to Decem-
ber 31 of the current year. 
A.3. Growth rates, separation rates, and hiring rates 
We define E jt as the number of all employees in estab-
lishment j at the end of year t; H jt as the number of em-
ployees who enter establishment j in period t , i.e., between
the end of year t − 1 and the end of year t ; and S jt as the
number of employees who are separated from establish-
ment j in period t , i.e., between the end of year t − 1 and
the end of year t . 
We then define employment growth between period
t − 1 and period t as 
g j,t−1 ,t = 
E jt − E j,t−1 
0 . 5 
(
E jt + E j,t−1 
) (A.1)
and observe that 
E jt − E j,t−1 = H jt − S jt . (A.2)
We define one-year hiring rates and separation rates as 
h jt = 
H jt 
0 . 5 
(
E jt + E j,t−1 
) (A.3)
and 
s jt = 
S jt 
0 . 5 
(
E jt + E j,t−1 
) . (A.4)
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 From Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) , we have g j,t−1 ,t = h jt − s jt . We 
also compute multi-period employment flows as 
E j,t+ k − E j,t−1 = 
τ= k ∑ 
τ=0 
(
E j,t+ τ −E j,t+ τ−1 
)
= 
τ= k ∑ 
τ=0 
(
H j,t+ τ −S j,t+ τ
)
= H j,t −1 ,t + τ − S j,t −1 ,t + τ . (A.5) 
Multi-period growth rates between periods t − 1 and t + k 
are defined as 
g j,t ,t + k = 
E j,t+ k − E j,t−1 
0 . 5 
(
E j,t+ k + E j,t−1 
) . (A.6) 
Multi-period hiring rates and separation rates are de- 
fined analogously to Eq. (A.6) . Generally, g j,t −1 ,t + k  = ∑ τ= k 
τ=0 g j,t + τ−1 ,t + τ and analogously for separation and hiring 
rates. 
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